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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19275 
TIMMY HILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with and convicted of Theft by 
Deception, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of Theft by Deception on 28 April, 1983 in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist presiding. On 31 May 1983, the trial court 
sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years. On 19 July 1983, the 
trial court ordered appellant's release from the Utah State 
Prison pending disposition of this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this court 
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 10 December 1Q82, Jack Alexander, an Ogden Citv 
policeman on special assignment with the State of Utah 
Narcotic and Liguor La11 Enforcement Bureau, and Frank, nn 
informer, met with appellant, Timmy Hill, to arrange for the 
purchase of an ounce of cocaine (T. 66-71, 101, 116-117, 169). 
Detective Alexander had been introduced to Timmy Hill by 
Carolina Jones (T. 5, lQ, 35, llS). Appellant and Detective 
Alexander settled on the price of $2100 for an ounce of 
cocaine and agreed to meet at Carolina's house later that 
afternoon (T. 71, 117, 135). 
Detective Alexander arrived at Carolina's house 
before appellant. When appellant arrived, he said he did not 
have the cocaine with him then, hut asked to see Detective 
Alexander's money (T. 49, 79, 91, 93, 118-121). Appellant 
said he would return with the cocaine later in the afternoon, 
and told Detective Alexander to listen for a car's horn and to 
walk out to the car when he heard it (T. 80, 94, 52). 
After the second meeting, appellant drove to a 
nearby store and obtained a box of baking soda and a "Big 
Nickel" newspaper with which he fasioned a package of white 
powder that resembled a package of cocaine (T. 119, 139). 
Appellant returned to Carolina's house about 5:20 that 
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afternoon (T. 21, 80). Detective Alexander went out to the 
car and sat in the back seat (T. 83). Appellant sat in the 
front passenger seat (T. 22, 140). Detective Alexanner asked 
appellant if he had the cocaine and appellant responded in the 
affirmative (T. 81). Appellant openen the package he had 
fashionen, showed it to Detective Alexander and assuren him 
that the purporten cocaine was good stuff, but nid not let 
Detective Alexander test it (T. 52, 84, 97, 104, 119-120). 
Appellant tole'! Detective Alexander that the price was $211)0 
(T. 84). He took the $2100 Detective Alexander handed to him 
(T. 84, 86, 99) and gave Detective Alexander the purported 
cocaine (T. 120). After receiving the money, appellant 
apparently placen it on the console between the car's bucket 
seats ( T. 23, 24, 8'!, 120). When the sale was completed, 
Detective Alexander signaled to other officers waiting nearby, 
and appellant was arrested (T. 84). Upon being arrested, 
appellant told the officers, "That's okay, that's okay. You 
ain't got shit on me, check the stuff out, sucker." (T. 87, 
100). The purported cocaine appellant sold to Detective 
Alexander proved to be the baking soda appellant had purchased 
earlier in the afternoon (T. "34, 109). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED AND 
CONVICTED OF THEFT BY DECEPTION BECAUSE 
THE IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
PROVISION PROSCRIBING DISTRIBUTION OF 
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES OOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Appellant contends that he was improperly convicted 
of Theft by Deception under Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-6-405 (1978), 
because his conduct was more specifically proscribed by Utah 
Code Ann. ~ 58-37b-4 (1983 Interim Supp.), Distribution of an 
Imitation Controlled Substance. Appellant relies on Hulmuth 
v. Morris, Utah, 598 P.2rl 333, 335 (1979) and State v. 
Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969) for the 
principle that where a defendant's conduct may be consinered 
to fall within the purview of two separate statutes, the 
statute which applies more specifically to the defendant's 
conduct takes precedence, and the rule that "where two 
statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose different 
penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser punishment." 
Helmuth at 335 (footnote omitted). 
"The fallacy in ••• [appellant's] argument is 
that the statute referred to does not prohibit the same 
conduct" as does § 76-6-405. Id. Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37b-4 
(1983 Interim Supp.) states: 
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It is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, distribute, or possess with 
intent to distribute, an imitation 
controlled substance. Any person who 
violates this section shall he guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor and upon conviction 
may be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 
six months, fined not more than 5299, or 
both. 
The Utah statute is nearly identical to Section 2.a. of the 
Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981). 
As defined by Utah Code Ann. ~ 5A-37b-2(4), an 
"imitation controlled substance" is 
• . a substance that is not a controlled 
substance, which by overall dosage unit 
substantially resembles a specific 
controlled substance in appearance (such 
as color, shape, size and markings), or by 
representations made, would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that the 
substance is a controlled substance. 
Baking soda, the substance appellant sold to the undercover 
agent, is not an "imitation controlled substance" according 
to the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, the 
Act does not proscribe appellant's conduct. The reasons for 
this become apparent upon examination of the Model Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act (1981). That act is designed to 
control the manufacture, distribution and use of "look-alike" 
drugs. 
LOok-alikes are tablets and capsules which 
are manufactured and imprinted to closely 
resemble or even duplicate the appearnce 
of well-known, brand name controlled 
substances, but which contain only 
non-controlled over-the-counter durgs such 
as caffeine, ephedrine, 
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phenylpropanolamine, actaminophen, or some 
combination of these substances. 
Look-alikes are advertised as being body 
stimulants, alternative energy sources, or 
nighttime analgesics. 
Prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act 
(1981). In addition to tablets and capsules, powder, 
and liquids may sometimes be "look-alike" drugs and thus 
"imitation controlled substances." 
The portion of the DEA Model Act which 
deals with "representations made: by the 
seller[,<; 58-37b-1 of the Utah Act,] is 
not really intended to reach look-alikes 
in tablet or capsule form, but rather, is 
intended to reach those cases where powder 
or liquid is represented to be controlled 
substances. 
Comment, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981). 
However, not all powders or liquids sold as substitutes for 
controlled substances are "imitation controlled substances." 
DEA believes that many of the existing and 
draft State Acts which have sought to 
reach the look-alike problem have placed 
too much emphasis on the representations 
made by the seller of the substances. 
Hence, the DEA Model Act seeks to place 
emphasis on the "look-alike" nature of 
most of the substances involved to sustain 
the burden of proving a violation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Comment, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981). 
The gravamen of the "look-alike nature" of "imitation 
controlled substances," including powders and liquids, 
according to the Prefatory Note of the Model Act, is that the 
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subs ta nee "resemble or • . • duplicate the appearance of 
well-known controlled substances," but most contain, instead 
of the controlled substance, any one or a combination of 
non-controlled over-the-counter drugs, usually stimulants or 
rippetite supressants . 
• . [T]he look-alike ingredients have a 
legitimate medical use, they are found i~ 
many of the more common over-the-counter 
products and when used as nirected, they 
are generally not harmful. 
prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act 
(1981). The baking soda soln in this case was not a substance 
which, when ingested, would cause the consumer to experience 
and effect similar to but less severe than the effect of the 
controlled substance it was "manufactured" (§ 58-378-2(3)) to 
imitate. Thus, it was not within the intent nor scope of the 
statute. A contrasting example is that of a tablet or capsule 
containing caffeine which is manufactured to resemble a 
controlled substance such as an amphetamine. Similarly, if 
the substitute substance appellant sold to the undercover 
agent had been composed of a white powder containing, in part, 
caffeine or ephedrine, then the baking soda wouln have been an 
"imitation controlled substance." 
The problems at which the Imitation Controlled 
Substance Act is aimed are described in the Prefatory Note to 
the Moclel Act as follows: 
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Look-alikes are touted as being completely 
safe and legal and consumers are advised 
to take several in order to get the full 
effect. Of course, the danger to a child 
who has been inqesting five or six 
caffeine pills and attempts the same thing 
with real amphetamines one day is obvious. 
More insidious is the grwoing climate of 
acceptance of these substances among 
students as their sale and use become 
widespead. Of immediate concern, however, 
are recent reports of hospital emergencies 
and even overdose deaths caused solely by 
ingestion of look-alikes. 
Prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act 
( 1981). Appellant's content ion that the Imitation Controllerl 
Substances Act, by statutory language, universally governs all 
conduct involving imitation controlled substances is 
unfounded. When read in conjunction with the Prefatory Note 
and Comment, the Act clearly specifies what kinds of 
substances it governs, and simple baking soda, under the facts 
of this case, falls outside the scope of the act. 
The Imitation Controlled Substances Act also clearly 
specifies what conduct it proscribes. Contrary to appellant's 
conclusion, there is no express or implied reference in 
~ 58-37b-4 to the act of selling substances to unknowing 
buyers with the intent to deceptively steal their money. This 
specific intent requirement is, however, found in the Theft hy 
Deception statute which states in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains 
money or exercises control over property 
of another by deception and with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
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Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-6-405 (1978). 
Thus, because the baking soda is not an "imitation 
controlled substance" as contemplated by the Imitation 
G1ntrolled Substances Act, and because appellant's conduct 
does not fall within the scope of the Act, ~ 58-37b-4 does not 
provide a more specific interdiction of appellant's conduct. 
Section 58-37b-4 simply does not apply to appellant's conduct, 
and therefore, no conflict exist between ~ 58-37b-4 and ~ 
76-6-405 under the facts of this case. 
Absent any conflict between the statutes appellant 
discusses, this Court need not address the question of whether 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37-19 (1953) would be applicable to the 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, the later enacted 
subchapter of the Controlled Substances Act (Utah Code Ann. 
~ 58-37-1 et seq. (1953) ). Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37-19 (1953) 
provides as follows: 
It is the purpose of this act to regulate 
and control the substances designated 
within section 58-37-4, and whenever the 
requirements prescribed, the offenses 
defined or the penalties imposed relating 
to substances controlled by this act shall 
be or appear to be in conflict with Title 
58, Chapter 17 or any other laws of this 
state, the provisions of this act shall be 
controlling. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 58-37-19 does not prohibit the use of provisions found 
elsewhere in the Utah Code in all cases. Only when the use of 
external provisions creates a conflict with the Controlled 
Substances Act are the external provisions superseded. In the 
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instant case, the statute uncler which appellant seeks a lessPr 
sentence does not apply to his conduct, and therefore, it is 
not in conflict with the statute uncler which appellant was 
appropriately charged, convicted, and sentencecl. 
The gravamen of appellant's arpeal is that becausr· 
his conduct is more specifically clef inecl and proscribed by 
~ 58-37b-4, that statute is controlling, ancl therefore, he was 
improperly charged under § 76-6-405. Appellant's argument 
fails because the statute he refers to cloes not aprly to his 
conduct. Therefore, appellant's the conviction ancl sentence 
must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, respond requests that 
this Court affirm the conviction and sentence for Theft hy 
Deception. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted th is ;<s-:;ay of November, 
19 83. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
·/?7~ 
General 
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